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Torts
Torts; physicians and surgeons-breast cancer, notice of
alternative treatments
Health and Safety Code §1704.5 (new).
SB 1893 (Roberti); STATS 1980, Ch 916
Support: California Nurses Association; Department of Finance;
Department of Health Services; National Organization for Women
Opposition: California Medical Association
In Cobbs v. Grant' the California Supreme Court held that physi-
cians and surgeons have a duty of reasonable disclosure regarding all
the choices of therapy available for the treatment of a patient's illness,
including information concerning the inherent and potential dangers
involved.2 The court excluded from this duty of disclosure relatively
minor risks inherent in common medical procedures.3 Chapter 916 ap-
plies this same rationale specifically to the treatment of patients with
breast cancer.4
With the enactment of Chapter 916, the failure of a physician or sur-
geon who is treating a patient with breast cancer to inform the patient
in writing of all the effective alternative methods of treatment that may
be medically viable, including surgery, radiology, and chemotherapy,
constitutes unprofessional conduct.5 A physician or surgeon can com-
ply with Chapter 916 by providing the patient with a standardized writ-
ten summary of all the alternative treatments for breast cancer.6 This
summary, to be developed by the Department of Health Services with
the aid of the Cancer Advisory Council, is to be written in layman's
language and in a language that can be understood by the patient, and
must include information about the advantages, disadvantages, risks,
and descriptions of the procedures for each of the alternative treat-
ments for breast cancer.7 The Board of Medical Quality Assurance is
responsible for printing and distributing the summary to all physicians
1. 8 Cal. 3d 229, 502 P.2d 1, 104 Cal. Rptr. 505 (1972).
2. See id. at 243, 502 P.2d at 10, 104 Cal. Rptr. at 514.
3. See id. at 244, 502 P.2d at 11, 104 Cal. Rptr. at 515.
4. Compare id with CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE §1704.5.
5. See CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE §2361 (definition of unprofessional conduct); CAL.
HEALTH & SAFETY CODE §1704.5.
6. See CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE §1704.5.
7. See id.





Civil Code §§3294, 3295 (amended).
SB 1989 (Maddy); STATS 1980, Ch 1242
Support: California Manufacturers Association; Office of the Gover-
nor, Legal Affairs Unit
Opposition: California Trial Lawyers Association
Existing law provides that a plaintiff may recover exemplary and pu-
nitive damages in civil actions for the breach of a noncontractual obli-
gation when the defendant has been guilty of oppression, fraud, or
malice.I Prior to the enactment of Chapter 1242, malice was defined as
"a motive and willingness to vex, harass, annoy or injure another per-
son," 2 and oppression meant subjecting a person to cruel or unjust
hardship in conscious disregard of his or her rights."'3 Also under prior
nonstatutory law, fraud was defined as "an act of trickery or deceit,
intentional misrepresentation, concealment or nondisclosure commit-
ted for the purpose of causing injury or of depriving a person of his
or her property or legal rights."4 The crucial element that must be es-
tablished, regardless of whether one attempts to prove oppression,
fraud, or malice, is an evil motive or animus malus on the part of the
defendant.' California case law, however, has provided no consistent
criteria for determining animus malus.6 A common area of disagree-
ment is centered on wvhether the court must assess the defendant's state
of mind to determine if there in fact existed an ill will towards the
plaintiff, or if the acts of the defendant justify a finding of malice by
showing a conscious disregard of safety.7
1. See CAL. CIV. CODE §3294. See also 4 B. WITKIN, SUMMARY OF CALIFORNIA LAW,
Torts §848 (8th ed. 1974), (Supp. 1980).
2. Haun v. Hyman, 223 Cal. App. 2d 615, 620, 36 Cal. Rptr. 84, 87 (1963); BAJI No. 14.71
(5th ed. 1969); see Kendall Yacht Corp. v. United Cal. Bank, 50 Cal. App. 3d 949, 958, 123 Cal.
Rptr. 848, 854 (1975); Cf. CAL. PENAL CODE §7.
3. See Roth v. Shell Oil Co., 185 Cal. App. 2d 676, 681-82, 8 Cal. Rptr. 514, 517 (1960).
4. BAJI No. 14.71 (5th ed. 1969).
5. Searle & Co. v. Superior Court, 49 Cal. App. 3d 22, 29-30, 122 Cal. Rptr. 218,223 (1975);
see CAL. CIv. CODE §3294.
6. See 49 Cal. App. 3d at 29-32, 122 Cal. Rptr. at 223-25; 4 B. WITKIN, SUMMARY OF CALI-
FORNIA LAW, Torts §850 (Supp. 1980).
7. See 49 Cal. App. 3d at 29-32, 122 Cal. Rptr. at 223-25. Compare Silberg v. California
Life Ins. Co., 11 Cal. 3d 452, 462-63, 521 P.2d 1103, 1110, 113 Cal. Rptr. 711, 718 (1974) and
Mason v. Mercury Gas Co., 64 Cal. App. 3d 471, 474-75, 134 Cal. Rptr. 545, 547 (1977) with
Bertero v. National Gen. Corp., 13 Cal. 3d 43, 65-66, 529 P.2d 608, 624-25, 118 Cal. Rptr. 184,
200-01 (1974).
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Chapter 1242 amends the Civil Code to set forth specific definitions
of malice, oppression, and fraud.' Under Chapter 1242, malice is now
defined as "conduct which is intended by the defendant to cause injury
to the plaintiff or conduct which is carried on by the defendant with a
conscious disregard of the rights or safety of others."9 Chapter 1242
retains the definition of oppression "as subjecting a person to cruel and
unjust hardship in conscious disregard of that person's rights."' 0 More-
over, fraud is now defined as "an intentional misrepresentation, deceit,
or concealment of a material fact known to the defendant with the in-
tention on the part of the defendant of thereby depriving a person of
property or legal rights or otherwise causing injury."" These defini-
tions would seem to do away with the previous divergent interpreta-
tions of the requirements for the assessment of punitive damages by
replacing inquiry into the defendant's state of mind with specific cri-
teria for finding an evil motive or animus malus.' 2
In addition, Chapter 1242 amends the Civil Code to expressly specify
the circumstances in which liability may be vicariously assessed against
an employer for punitive damages.' 3 Under prior law, an employer
could be held liable for punitive damages based on the acts of his or
her agent if the employer authorized or ratified the agent's acts. 4
Chapter 1242 provides that an employer will be liable for punitive
damages resulting from the acts of an employee only if the employer
(1) had advance knowledge of the unfitness of the employee and (2)
employed the person with a conscious disregard of the rights and safety
of others, or authorized or ratified the wrongful conduct of the em-
ployee.15 With respect to a corporate employer, Chapter 1242 requires
that the advance knowledge, ratification, or act of oppression, fraud, or
malice be on the part of an officer, director, or managing agent of the
corporation.' 6
Chapter 1242 also places limitations on pretrial discovery relating to
punitive damages. 7 Existing law allows the court to grant a protective
8. See CAL. CIV. CODE §3294(c).
9. Compare id. §3294(c)(1) with BAJI No. 14.71 (5th ed. 1969).
10. Compare CAL. CIV. CODE §3294(c)(2) with Roth v. Shell Oil Co., 185 Cal. App. 2d 676,
681-82, 8 Cal. Rptr. 514, 517 (1960).
11. Compare CAL. CIV. CODE §3294(c)(3) with BAJI No. 14.71 (5th ed. 1969).
12. Compare CAL CIV. CODE §3294(c) with Searle & Co. v. Superior Court, 49 Cal. App. 3d
22, 29-32, 122 Cal. Rptr. 223-25 and 4 B. WITKIN, SUMMARY OF CALIFORNIA LAW, Torts §850
(Supp. 1980).
13. See CAL. CIV. CODE §3294(b).
14. See 4 B. WITKIN, SUMMARY OF CALIFORNIA LAW, Torts §855 (8th ed. 1974), (Supp.
1980).
15. See CAL. CIV. CODE §3294(b).
16. Id.
17. See id. §3295(c).
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order requiring the plaintiff to produce evidence of a prima facie case
of liability for punitive damages prior to the introduction of evidence
of either the defendant's financial condition or of profits gained by
wrongful conduct.18 Chapter 1242 prohibits pretrial discovery by the
plaintiff of the defendant's financial condition or of wrongful profits
unless the court, upon motion by the plaintiff supported by appropriate
affidavits, 19 determines that there is a substantial probability that the
plaintiff will prevail in the claim and specifically enters an order al-
lowing the pretrial discovery.20 The plaintiff, however, is still entitled
to subpoena documents or witnesses to be available at the trial for the
purpose of establishing the defendant's financial condition or wrongful
profits. 21
18. See id. §3295(a).
19. See id. §3294(c) (the court has discretion to order a hearing on the plaintiff's probability
of success).
20. See Id. §3295(c).
21. See id.
Torts; indemnity--construction contracts
Civil Code §§2782, 2782.5 (amended).
SB 2000 (Beverly); STATS 1980, Ch 211
Support: Associated General Contractors; Office of the Governor,
Legal Affairs Unit
Prior to the enactment of Chapter 211, indemnity I provisions con-
tained in a construction contract2 that purported to shield the promisee
against liability for losses caused solely3 by that party's own negligence,
including losses caused by design defects,4 were held to be void and
unenforceable as against public policy.' A statutory exception, how-
ever, provides that a party to a construction contract and the "owner or
other party for whose account the contract is being performed can, be-
tween themselves, agree to allocate or limit liability for design defects.6
Because of the broad statutory definition previously given to indem-
nity, the possibility existed that the "no fault" provisions allocating lia-
1. See CAL. CIV. CODE §2772 (definition of indemnity).
2. See Id. §2783.
3. See Conley & Sayne, lndemnity Revisited- Insurance of the Shiing Risk, 22 HASTINGS
LJ. 1201, 1211-13 (1971).
4. See CAL. CIV. CODE §2784.
5. See CAL. STATS. 1967, c. 1327, §1, at 3158 (enacting CAL. CIV. CODE §2782). See also
CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE §7034 (prohibiting licensed contractors from inserting such clauses into
any contract or being a party with another licensed subcontractor to any contract containing such
clauses).
6. See CAL. CIV. CODE §2782.5.
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bility regardless of fault, often negotiated by the parties to commercial
construction contracts,7 might be construed as indemnity provisions
and thus be held invalid.' Chapter 211 prevents this possible frustra-
tion of the true intent of the contracting parties by expanding the ex-
isting statutory exception permitting allocation of liability for design
defects to specifically include those allocations of liability arising out of
or relating to the construction contract that have been negotiated and
expressly agreed to by the parties.' In addition, Chapter 211 now pro-
vides that all provisions in a construction contract purporting to indem-
nify the promisee for liability for design defects will be void and
unenforceable, whether or not they are caused by the sole negligence of
the promisee. 0
7. See Letter from Senator Robert G. Beverly to Governor Edmund G. Brown, Jr., June 10,
1980 (copy on file at the Pac#Fc Law Journal).
8. See id.
9. Compare CAL. CIV. CODE §2782.5 with CAL. STATS. 1967, c. 1327, §2, at 3159.
10. Compare CAL. CIV. CODE §2782 with CAL. STATS. 1967, c. 1327, §1, at 3158.
Torts; premises liability-recreational purposes immunity
Civil Code §846 (amended).
AB 1966 (McAlister); STATS 1980, Ch 408
Support: California Cattlemen's Association; California Forest Pro-
tective Association; Department of Fish and Game; Office of the
Governor, Legal Affairs Unit
Existing law provides that the owner of an estate in real property has
no duty to keep the premises safe for entry or use, or to give a warning
of hazardous conditions, to persons entering for recreational purposes.'
The courts, however, have applied this recreational purposes immunity
to a limited group of real property owners.2 The term "owner of an
estate" was defined by the courts as an interest in real property that is
or may become possessory.3 Real property interests that are nonposses-
1. See CAL. CIV. CODE §846. Although Rowland v. Christian, 69 Cal. 2d 108, 443 P.2d 561,
70 Cal. Rptr. 97 (1968) has generally abrogated the common law emphasis on plaintiff status,
Section 846 is still viewed as a statutory exception providing that recreational users will be owed
the duty of care owed to a trespasser. See generally English v. Marin Mun. Water Dist., 66 Cal.
App. 3d 725, 730, 136 Cal. Rptr. 224, 228 (1977); 4 B. WITKIN, SUMMARY OF CALIFORNIA LAW,
Torts §§579-580 (general discussion of the duty owed to trespassers before and after Rowland)
(8th ed. 1974); W. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS, §58 (4th ed. 1971); 38 CAL. ST.
B.J. 647 (1963) (Selected 1963 Legislation).
2. See O'Shea v. Claude C. Wood Co., 97 Cal. App. 3d 903, 910-11, 159 Cal. Rptr. 125, 129
(1979); Darr v. Lone Star Indus., Inc., 94 Cal. App. 3d 895, 901, 157 Cal. Rptr. 90, 93-94 (1979);
Smith v. Scrap Disposal Corp., 96 Cal. App. 3d 523, 528-29, 158 Cal. Rptr. 134, 136-37 (1979).
3. See 94 Cal. App. 3d at 901, 157 Cal. Rptr. at 93-94. See generally RESTATEMENT OF
PROPERTY §9 (1936); R. POWELL, 2 POWELL ON REAL PROPERTY §172 (1977).
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sory interests, therefore, did not receive the protection.
Chapter 408, in an apparent response to these court decisions, applies
recreational purpose immunity to an owner of any estate or any other
interest in real property, including both possessory and nonpossessory
estates.' Under current law, however, an owner of an estate or any
interest in real property who gives permission to a person to enter or
use the land does not (1) constitute that person a licensee or invitee, (2)
extend assurance that the premises are safe, or (3) assume responsibility
for any injury to person or property caused by an act of the person
given permission to enter or use the land.' The owner will be liable
only if he acts with malice, has received consideration for his permis-
sion, or expressly invites the person onto his land.7
4. See 94 Cal. App. 3d at 901, 157 Cal. Rptr. at 93-94.
5. See CAL. CIV. CODE §846.
6. See id.
7. See id.
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